

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Tuval Ogondee McKoy, # 14534-056,	)	C/A No.: 1:12-2441-SB-SVH
	)	
Petitioner,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	
	)	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Mildred Rivera, Warden,	)	
	)	
Respondent.	)	
	)	
	)	

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Petitioner, proceeding *pro se*, was convicted in the United District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina of various drug offenses, firearms offenses, and three counts of wire fraud. He brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking relief pursuant to the holdings in *United States v. Simmons*, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011), and *Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder*, 130 S.Ct. 2577 (2010). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge.

#### I. Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner was indicted on July 6, 1993. *United States v. Hendricks, et al.*, No. 5:93-102-F-8 (E.D.N.C.), at Entry #123. He pled guilty to one count of the indictment, but went to trial and was convicted on the other counts. [Entry #1 at 2]. He was sentenced on March 8, 1994. *Id.* at 3. Petitioner's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal and the Supreme Court later denied discretionary appellate

review.<sup>1</sup> *United States v. Morsley*, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995), *cert. denied*, *McKoy v. United States*, 516 U.S. 1065 (1996). In 1997, Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate the convictions and sentences, which was denied by the district court on November 21, 1997. *See McKoy v. United States*, No. 5:97-315 (E.D.N.C.). The Fourth Circuit dismissed the subsequent appeal. *See United States v. McCoy*, 139 F.3d 895 [Table], 1998 WL 168408 (4th Cir. Mar. 26, 1998). Plaintiff filed a second § 2255 motion on June 20, 2012. *United States v. Hendricks, et al.*, No. 5:93-102-F-8 (E.D.N.C.), at Entry #126. That case remains pending in the Eastern District of North Carolina.

## II. Discussion

### A. Standard of Review

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of this petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Court, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and other habeas corpus statutes. Pro se petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. *Gordon v. Leake*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially

<sup>1</sup>It is appropriate for this court to take judicial notice of Petitioner's prior cases. *See Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil*, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that "[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice of ascertainable facts is in noticing the content of court records") (internal citation omitted).

meritorious case. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se petition or complaint, the petitioner's or plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. *Merriweather v. Reynolds*, 586 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (D.S.C. 2008). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990).

#### B. Analysis

“[I]t is well established that defendants convicted in federal court are obliged to seek habeas relief from their convictions and sentences through § 2255.” *Rice v. Rivera*, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing *In re Vial*, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). “However, § 2241 may be utilized by a federal prisoner to challenge the legality of his or her conviction or sentence if he or she can satisfy the mandates of the so-called § 2255 ‘savings clause’ . . . .” *Reyes-Requena v. United States*, 243 F.3d 893, 901 (5th Cir. 2001); *see also Ennis v. Olsen*, No. 00-7361, 2000 WL 1868982, at \*1 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 2000). The “savings clause” states:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him

relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). In other words, as applied here, Petitioner's § 2241 action is barred unless he can demonstrate that the relief available to him under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. It is noted that "the remedy afforded by § 2255 is not rendered inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual has been unable to obtain relief under that provision, or because an individual is procedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion."

*See In Re Vial*, 115 F.3d at 1194 n. 5 (citations omitted).

To trigger the "savings clause" of § 2255(e) and now proceed under § 2241, Petitioner would have to show that something more should be considered by the court than that authorized by § 2255, such as a retroactive change in the law as contemplated in *In re Jones*, 226 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2000). In *Jones*, the court held that a petitioner must show that "(1) at the time of the conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gate-keeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law." *Jones*, 226 F.3d at 333–34.


Petitioner cannot satisfy all the elements of this test. Specifically, the second element of the test requires that "substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal." Petitioner contends that, after

his conviction, the substantive law on applying recidivist enhancements changed as a result of the holdings in *United States v. Simmons*, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011), and *Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder*, 130 S.Ct. 2577 (2010). However, on August 20, 2012, the Fourth Circuit held that *Simmons* and *Carachuri-Rosendo* are not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. *United States v. Powell*, 691 F.3d 554, 558–60 (4th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on the holdings in *Simmons* and *Carachuri-Rosendo*, and he has failed to trigger the savings clause of § 2255.

### III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that this case be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.



November 30, 2012  
Columbia, South Carolina

Shiva V. Hodges  
United States Magistrate Judge

**The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached  
“Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”**

**Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation**

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk  
United States District Court  
901 Richland Street  
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

**Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation.** 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).